The disturbing scenes at the Kabul airport and the justified fear of what will happen to Afghan under Taliban rule have formed a heated national conversation about what the United States should not have done in Afghanistan. Much of the disagreement has been set up at the doorstep of the Biden Administration for a poorly planned evacuation that has left U.S. citizens and Afghan allies at risk. Some reasons for the crisis might have been averted if evacuations of U.S. personnel and Afghans who worked with the U.S. had started sooner. And the Administration underestimated the speed at which the Afghan security forces would destroy in the face of the recent Taliban offensive. But if the U.S. exit had been better set, the Taliban invention would have occurred sooner or later, with the harsh ending for the people of Afghanistan. The short-term priority should be to evacuate U.S. personnel as fast as possible and provide safe havens- including visas and financial support.-for Afghans fleeing the Taliban. But for the question of what should have been done differently, keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan indefinitely was not a clear answer, as Biden mentioned in his speech before. “After 20 years, a trillion dollars spend training and equipping hundreds of thousands of Afghan National Security and Defense Forces, 2448 Americans killed, 20,722 wounded, and untold thousands were coming home with unseen trauma to their mental health- I will not send another generation of America to war in Afghanistan with no expectation of gaining another outcome (Economist, 2021) .”
Given this reality, we should not resist the argument of those who have long advocated for our failed military mission in Afghanistan. If we had “stayed the course” militarily, situations could have occurred differently. As the Washington Post made clear with the release of the Afghanistan Papers- which are discussed in a new book written by Post reporter Craig Whitlock- U.S. officials have long known that the U.S. backed military. Police personnel in Afghanistan were not a visible battling force, caused by corruption and lack of essential support from the top level of the Afghan Government. Even as the last Taliban offensive moved forward, Afghan troops were forced to leave their posts due to a lack of essentials.
Goods like food and ammunition. The will to support an incompetent government in Kabul of questionable legitimacy just was not there. The repeated public argument by U.S. military and civilian personnel that the Afghan forces were developing and were combat capable belied their private pessimism- in short, they were lies set up to maintain U.S. support for the war (Brenner, 2021).
As the 20th memorial of the 9/11 attacks nears, it is long past time for a radical assessment of America’s overly militarized, relentlessly interventionist foreign policy. Cost of War Project at Brown University claimed that America’s post 9/11 wars had incurred obligations of over $6.4 trillion; cost hundreds of thousands of lives on all sides, and left hundreds of thousands of military personnel dead or with severe physical wounds, or with traumatic brain damage or post-traumatic disorder. In Iraq, the result was a corrupt and repressed regime that began to the conquest of large parts of the country by the radical terrorist, as Iraqi troops destroyed in the face of their 2014 onslaught- for many of the same reasons involving corruption, lack of supplies, and plummeting morale that characterized Afghan soldiers at the beginning of the Taliban’s final offensive. An outcome was 20 years of devastating conflict in Afghanistan, followed by the Taliban’s rise to power. Both incidents should be object lessons in the limits- but dangerous consequences- of relying on military force as the primary rule of U.S. global involvement (Chotiner, 2021).
On August 2021, as the Taliban entered Kabul, the last remaining major Afghan city not under the group’s control- the President of the country, Ashraf Ghani, fled to Tajikistan, making clear that the U.S. backed Afghan Government had collapsed. In April, five months ago, President Biden announced that all U.S. would be leaving Afghanistan by the twentieth anniversary of 9/11. Since then, experts have accused the Administration of conducting a rushed, poorly planned, and chaotic withdrawal. On Thursday, the U.S. government discussed sending marines and soldiers to help evacuate embassy personnel. But the speed of the Taliban movement has stunned American officials and left even Afghans trying to flee the country. Biden has sought blame to the Afghan Government based on criticism about his plan, saying, “They have got to fight for themselves.”
Most people think the speed of the political collapse in Afghanistan surprised many people. The pathway of the destruction was predicted. It has occurred in Afghan political and military history a couple of times before. But there was a momentum of people recalculating where their interests lay, switching sides, and capitulating without violence that they don’t believe the Biden Administration had expected when it announced its timetable in the spring.
Political experts describe two poles representing the range of choices that the Biden Administration faced. More or less, the policy returned to the second term of the Obama Administration- which was a smaller, sustained deployment. There were twenty-five hundred troops there when Biden Administration came to office. The rate of casualties by NATO forces was almost at the level of traffic accidents for much of the past couple of years. So a sustained, smaller deployment not free, but nothing like the expenditures of the past linked to a search for some more political result had been visible. The Trump government maintained that path, too, bringing it up from the Obama Administration, and Trump had become quite ambitious about it. It had communicated with the Taliban an agreement with a timetable, including American withdrawal. But, until Trump got to that point, it had been following the same pathway as its predecessor. It is in between whether the rewards of a shaking degree of stability explained having the small-to-medium deployment that America has in other parts of the world. That is what you are going to see from Washington. The argument to the Biden Administration’s policy is not going to be a never-ending war and the defeat of the Taliban; it will be a critique of the haste with which it pulled the plug on what was not a significant deployment that was not incurring a lot of casualties (Maizland, 2021).
The Taliban conquered more of the country than they lost power. They are better equipped, having seized the weapons America showered on the Afghan army. They have now won the affirmation, defeating a superpower. The insurgents have made a show of kindness, pledging that they will not take revenge on those who helped for the toppled Government and insisting that they will pursue women’s rights within their interpretation of Islamic law. But that definition kept most women out of school and confined to their homes when the group was last in power. In the 1990s, brutal punishments, flogging, stoning, amputations were common. The freedoms Afghans in the city took for granted over the past 20 years have just gone up in jeopardy. It is an appalling outcome for Afghanistan’s 39 million people and profoundly damaging America. It is not surprising that America didn’t manage to create Afghanistan into a democracy. Nation-building is complex, and few imagined that it could become Switzerland. Nor was it unreasonable for Joe Biden to draw the conflict want a close. America has spent more than 20 years in a place of only modest strategic significance about which many American voters have long since ceased to care. The reason for the invasion- to dismantle al-Qaeda’s main base of operations- was primarily achieved, though that achievement could now be reversed. Given the American deployment duration, scale, and expense, the claim that America is showing itself as a fickle ally by letting the Afghan Government fall is also overblown. The corrupt regime in Kabul was not an ally in the way that Germany or Japan is (Chotiner, 2021). It was far weaker, more corrupt, and utterly dependent on America for its survival. But none of that absolved Americans of the responsibility to withdraw in an orderly fashion. Mr. Biden failed to show even a fraction of care for the welfare of Afghans. The irony is that America had a plan to do that, which had been in jeopardy for a few years. It essentially scaled down its garrison, from around 100,000 troops in 2011 to fewer than 10,000 by 2017, along with several other NATO countries. They were not supposed to destroy the Taliban but stop the Afghan army’s collapse, primarily through airpower, and force the Taliban to the negotiating table. Apologists for Mr. Biden claimed that his predecessor, Trump, had already set up this plan by trying to wrap up to a conclusion before last year’s presidential election in America. Mr. Trump was indeed so desperate to set up a quick deal that he believed preposterous terms set to end America’s deployment without even securing a ceasefire, let alone a clear pan to clear the civil war. By the time Mir Biden started, he had reduced the American presence to little more than 2000 soldiers and had promised to get the rest out by May 1st (Brenner, 2021).
But Mr. Biden did not have to follow this agreement. He didn’t refuse to keep to the original timetable. The Taliban were not holding up their end of the bargain, gaining their advantage on the battlefield instead of negotiating in good faith with the Afghan Government. That has been grounds to stop the American withdrawal. There was little political pressure within America to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Yet, Mr. Biden was trying an arbitrary and
Flippant deadline of his own, finding to end the war by the 20th anniversary of 9/11. Even though the speed of the Afghan Government’s implosion surprised most observers, including this newspaper, America’s soldiers and politicians were among the most optimistic, forcing that destruction was a disappearing remote prospect. And when it became clear that the Afghan force was melting away, Mr. Biden pressed on intransigently.
As a result, America’s willingness to deter its enemies and reaffirm its friends has faded. Its intelligence was flawed, its planning was rigid, its leaders capricious, and its concern for allies minimal. That is likely to encourage and its respect for supporters minimal. That is likely to encourage jihadists everywhere, who will take the Taliban’s victory as evidence that God is on their side. It will also promote adventurism on hostile governments such as Russia’s or China’s and worry America’s friends. Mr. Biden has defended the withdrawal by claiming that Afghanistan was a distraction from more pressing problems, such as America’s rivalry with China. But by withdrawing from Afghanistan in such a chaotic fashion, Mr. Biden will have those other problems harder to deal with (Vanda, 2021).
The symbolic withdrawal does not reduce the obligation of America and its allies to ordinary Afghans but increases it. They should use what leverage they will have to urge moderation on the Taliban, especially in their treatment of women. The showed will need humanitarian aid. Western nations should also admit more Afghan refugees, whose ranks are likely to swell and provide generous assistance to Afghanistan’s neighbors to look after those who stay in the region. The haste of European countries to declare that they can not take in many persecuted Afghans even as violet zealots seize control is almost as lamentable as America’s botched exit. It is too late to protect Afghanistan, but there is still time to help its people. The start of September brought the end of America’s 20-year campaign in Afghanistan. It also brought the end of President Joe Biden’s worst month in office. In a speech to celebrate the day, Mr. Biden was turned angry, defiant, and unrepentant. He started by lauding the evacuation effort as an “extraordinary success.” No country has ever done something like it in all of history,” he claimed. To critics who said the extraction could have been better handled, the President said: “I disagree,” Those who ordered that a low-grade deployment of American soldiers could have stayed did not believe that there was no such incident was a low-grade war, Biden claimed (Economist, 2021).
“I committed to the United States that I end the war,” he said proudly. Mr. Biden said that America had, in essence, squandered $21tr in a country that had long ceased to present any clear national security, and in the process, had spoiled its skill to deal with contemporary challenges from Russia and China. Elites shape public opinion, and Mr. Biden has taken criticism from all quarters as the Republicans were expected, even if it was unstable with their approval for the dialogue the Trump administration had with the Taliban. As previously criticized Mr. Biden for not adhering to Mr. Trump’s earlier complete withdrawal deadline by May 1st, Josh Hawley, a Republican Senator, has shouted at Mr. Biden to resign. But Democrats in Congress have also criticized the Administration’s planning as riven with “failures.” Their committees intend to investigate the debacle. Mainstream news outlets, which Democrats still believe, have turned against Mr. Biden so that the conservative media never did against Mr. Trump.
While there is undoubtedly more study to be done, human rights in Afghanistan have drastically improved since the Taliban’s ousting in 2001. Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution incorporates democratic ideals and recognizes a wide range of universal civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights under international law. Though not consistently enforced or implemented in practice, human rights laws have provided a crucial foundation for Afghans to recognize their rights and advocate for change. If one can be reached, the status of human rights in Afghanistan depends heavily on the intensity of violence and the strength of Intra-Afghan political settlement. A Taliban take over will likely erode hard-fought gains in human rights- specifically those of women and girls, minority groups, and free speech- that have allowed Afghans to enjoy greater freedoms and quality of life (Brenner, 2021).
During the 1990s, the Taliban imposed severe restrictions on Afghan women’s access to health care, education, and jobs. Women were stopped from working outside of the home, attending school, and leaving their homes without a male chaperone. Laws were brutally enforced by the ‘religious police’ through public beating, arrests, and executions. Members of the Taliban regime perpetuated murder, rape, kidnapping, and forced marriage crimes.
Regularly. The Taliban’s behavior towards women has softened over the years and is enforced differently across provinces and districts under its control. Although the Taliban claim they no longer oppose girls’ education, most leaders do not allow girls to attend school past puberty, and some have outright prohibited girls’ schools. However, Taliban authorities in some districts have been more flexible when local demand for education is high (Vanda, 2021).
The Taliban have expressed their commitment to upholding and guaranteeing all women’s rights afforded them by Islamic law. Yet if the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan, women, and girls will likely face increased gender-based discrimination and violence. A non- conditions-based withdrawal leaves the Afghan Government with little leverage to protect the rights privileges protect the rights and freedoms of women and girls in Afghanistan (Economist, 2021).
Historically, the Taliban have persecuted ethnic and religious minorities and specifically targeted the Shi’a Hazaras, Afghanistan’s most persecuted religious minority groups. Hazaras constitute approximately 9% of the Afghan population and have endured systematic discrimination, targeted violence, and displacement by the Taliban for decades. In recent years, the Taliban have attempted to diversify its support base and increase its influence among Afghanistan’s minority religious and ethnic groups to transform its global reputation, establish itself as a legitimate leader, and undermine the Afghan Government’s authority. Despite fronting itself as inclusive, the Taliban maintain an exclusionary stance on religious reforms, refusing to recognize Shia Muslims and other minority groups (Vanda, 2021). In negotiation, the Taliban have insisted on adopting the Hanafi school of Sunni jurisprudence in Afghanistan’s legislative system. Establishing Hanafi jurisprudence would exclude Afghan Shia Muslims and other religious minorities such as Sikhs and Hindus. In addition, the presence of foreign Islamic extremist groups in Afghanistan has led to a rise in attacks against religious minorities. Without protection from U.S. and NATO counterterrorism activities, religious minorities will be increasingly targeted by groups like the Islamic State (Chotiner, 2021).
Targeted attacks and intimidation of journalists, media workers, and activists have been used.
To silence critics and undermine the prospects of an open society in Afghanistan. The Taliban have said they support freedom of speech within the Islamic principles of national interests. In the absence of international protection, Afghans will experience increased censorship of information, and critics of the Taliban will be violently suppressed (Kachiar, 2021).
If the Taliban returns, Afghanistan risks becoming a haven for international terrorists again. A non-conditions-based U.S. withdrawal is likely to empower terrorist as well as extremist groups who see U.S. withdrawal as a clear sign of victory. Previous drawdowns in both Iraq and Afghanistan provide insight into the consequences of the U.S. September 11th withdrawal. Former President Obama announced withdrawing all U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of his second term, but the deadline emboldened the Taliban. Similarly, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq enabled ISIS to take over Mosul three years later in 2014. In each scenario, miscalculated drawdowns undermined hard-won achievements in the fight against terrorism (Williams, 2021). Without crucial human intelligence and direct-action capabilities, the U.S. may lose the ability to monitor expansionist activity by various terror groups in Afghanistan. An emboldened al-Qaeda or the Islamic State may reconstitute, posing significant risks to Afghan civilians, neighboring counties, and the west (Bezhan, 2016).
The withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan has profound implications, which the United States, along with its partners and allies, must be set up to deal with. A non-conditions-based withdrawal deadline has weakened the Afghan Government’s negotiating power. The Taliban will likely have the upper hand in all possible outcomes of the Intra-Afghan negotiations. An already fragile Afghan government will lose legitimacy, and the capacity of Afghan security forces will be severely weakened. In the absence of Western troops, Afghanistan risks becoming a haven for international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Brenner, 2021).
Furthermore, the country could become a playing field for excellent power competition with China. Hard-fought gains in human rights, specifically women and girls, minority
Groups, and free speech, will likely be lost if the Taliban return to power. Foreign assistance to Afghanistan may decrease, and mounting insecurity will threaten an already dire humanitarian situation and undermine development progress. Therefore, it is essential that the United States protect its remaining assets, establish clear guidelines for evacuation, safeguard America’s allies in-country, maintain a rapid reaction force, continue targeted assistance to the Afghan Government while strengthening oversight capabilities, and develop contingency plans with partners neighboring countries (Vanda, 2021).
Some critics describe the U.S. hasty evacuation from Kabul as President Biden’s ‘Saigon moment.’ In the 1970s, the Saigon moment started massive anti-war sentiment among the U.S. public. This influenced the U.S. internal and diplomatic policies for many years. At present, it cannot be concluded whether or not Washington’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan is of as vital significance as the ‘Saigon moment’ was. It depends on how Afghanistan develops. But it will primarily affect the Biden administration’s internal affairs and diplomacy (Williams, 2021).
Chaotic U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan can be seen as the first major crisis of Biden’s presidency. It is a big obstacle for him and his team to deal with. This year, Biden and the Democratic Party are supposed to prepare for the mid-term election held in 2022. It is a bad start for Biden into this forthcoming political season. If the tricky situation in Afghanistan continues well into 2022, it will directly hit Biden and the Democratic Party in the mid-term election (Economist, 2021).
Whether the U.S. shaky withdrawal from Afghanistan rewinds the Saigon moment or not, Washington cannot regain global leadership as it achieved after the Saigon moment. The world has changed in which the U.S. cannot dominate the world solely by depending on its national power. It is unable to do so and has to rely on its allies. But the latter bunch is not confident in the U.S. The U.S. illusion toward hegemony has been burst. Its debacle in Afghanistan exemplifies such disillusions, and Washington accepts such a reality (Economist, 2021).
Right not, the U.S. is incapable of regaining global leadership and hegemony as it did in the 1970s. It is also because its relations with China have been significantly changed. In the 1970s, the U.S. attempts to work with China have been considerably altered. In the 1970s, the U.S. tried to work with China to deal with the Soviet Union. Washington saw China as an essential strategic force that the U.S. could rely on heavily. But now, Washington has no significant power to rest on. The majority of countries worldwide are unwilling to see China as an enemy or take sides between China and the U.S. This is the dilemma the U.S. is now soberly encountering. The Biden administration is in an unhelpful position (Tengzun, 2021).
In conclusion, the Taliban effectively delivered the order and enforced rules, such as ensuring that teachers show up to guide when it allowed schools to run. That government staff did not steal supplies from clinics. The Taliban also got much political capital from delivering swift, not corrupt, and enforced dispute resolution. And it has excelled in taxing the economy in Afghanistan. Furthermore, if the Taliban rules very brutally, international actors will remain sanctions on the group and perhaps intensify them. Countries and businesses seeking legal engagement with the Taliban’s Afghanistan would be deterred from doing so. Unless humanitarian exceptions from the sanctions are guaranteed, even NGO work could grind into jeopardy (Chotiner, 2021).
Reference
Author Unknown, “Bidan’s Debacle”, The Economist, Published on 21st August 2021.
Bezhan Fred. “Ethnic minorities are fueling the Taliban’s expansion in Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy. 15 June 2016
Brenner, C. “Preparing for the Consequences of Withdrawal from Afghanistan”, American Security Project, May 2021
Chotiner, I “How America Failed in Afghanistan”, the New Yorker, published on August 15th 2021.
Kachiar, Y “Why are the Taliban Wooing a Persecuted Afghanistan Minority Group?” The Diplomat. 28 May 2020. Accessed September 2021.
Maizland, L. “The Taliban in Afghanistan” Council on Foreign Relation. 15 March 2021. Accessed September 2021.
Tengjun, Z. “Unlike After Saigon moment, U.S. can’t stand tall after Afghan failure”, Global Times, published on August 31st 2021.
Vanda, F. “Will the Taliban regime survive”, Brookings, Published on August 31st 2021
William, H. “Failure in Afghanistan, over 40 Years in the Making”, Forbes, Published on August 18th 2021.
